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Summary findings
When  Argentina  initiated  reform  of its transport  sector  private  investment.  Designing  sustainable  reform  requires
in  1989,  it had  few models  to follow.  It was the first  a commitment  by governnment to minimize  its  role in the
Latin  American  country  to privatize  its intercity  railroad,  sector  and  to respect  its original  promises  to both  users
to  explicitly  organize  intraport  competition,  and  to grant  and concessionaires.
a private  concession  to operate  its subway.  It was second  Argentina  has learned  the  importance  of building  up
(after  Japan)  to privatize  its urban  commuter  railways  the  regulatory  capacity  needed  to monitor  contracts,
and  one  of the first  in the  developing  world  to grant  road  especially  when  initial  uncertainty  about  demand  and
concessions  to private  operators.  cost  conditions  is strong  and  renegotiation  is the
Argentina's  experience  shows  that  transport  probable  outcome  of daring  reform.
privatization  and deregulation  provide  efficiency  gains  The  government's  main  challenge  in monitoring
that  can be  delivered  to  users.  Despite  unexpectedly  high  contracts  is to get enough  information  to reach  a balance
residual  subsidy  requirements,  fiscal costs are  lower,  in its decisions  about  distributing  efficiency  gains  fairlv
services  have improved,  and new  investment  is taking  between  consumers  and  private  investors.  This is one
place.  area  in which  Argentina  may  not  yet have met  the
Argentina's  decade-long  experience  shows  that  the  challenge.  As the last wave  of contract  extensions  in rail
reform  process  involves  learning  by doing.  Inexperienced  and  roads  comes  to  an end,  one  issue is likely  to be the
new regulators  quickly  face the challenges  in controlling  need  for  better  targeting  of subsidies  for  the poor.
monopoly  power  and providing  long-run  incentives  for
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When Argentina initiated the reforms of its transport sector in  1989, it did not  have much of a
model to  follow.  Thatcher's  infrastructure reforms  in the United Kingdom had  provided strong
inspirations for the overall agenda but  Argentina was constructing its own path-breaking way. It
was the  first in  Latin America to privatize  its inter-city railroad,  the first to  organize intra-port
competition explicitly, the first to consider granting a private concession to operate its subway, the
second (after Japan) to privatize its urban commuters railways and one of the first in the developing
world to concession its road to private operators.
Although one of the goals of these reforms was to introduce competition wherever possible
and improve service quality, the most pressing objective was fiscal. The reform was to contribute to
the shrinking  of the size of the government in the infrastructure sector while attracting as much
private financing as possible to finance pressing improvements and expansion needs. Auctions to
award concession contracts were the main instrunent  used to introduce competition and achieve
efficiency gains while the reductions in subsidy requirements from the government or maximization
of payments to the government were built in the process to achieve the fiscal goals. The concession
contracts were then expected to become the main instrument for a  government getting ready to
deliver in its new role as a regulator of "privatized" monopolies.
Considering the size and scope of the changes and the fact that by the end of nineties,  so
many countries are following the UK's  and Argentina's pioneering efforts, its is surprising that so
little has been written in the academic literature on this  experience. While the United Kingdom's
privatization  and  deregulation  have  been  thoroughly  surveyed  (see,  for  example,  Journal  of
Transport  Economics  and  Policy  (1990.vo124.n 03),  Transport  Reviews  (1985.vol5.n°2),  etc.),
Argentina's transport reform has not received the attention it deserves in view of its role modeling
throughout the developing world.'.
This  article  provides  an  overview of  this  experience  in  ports,  rail  and  roads  including
significant developments in 1998 which have resulted in the renegotiation of most of the contracts
signed since 1990 in railways and roads. 2The rest of the paper is organized as follows. For each
sector we describe  the before and after deregulation and privatization situation  and  discuss the
I  World  Bank sponsored  document  have  produced  most of the published  evaluation  of this experience  to date  (Kogan  and Thompson,
1994;  Kopicki  and Thompson,  1995;  Barbero,  1996;  Estache  et alt. 1996,  Gomez-Ibanez  1997.
2 Airport is left out because it was only concessioned less than two years ago and not enough time has elapsed to
provide a fair assessment of the outcome of what is proving to be a highly complex challengeoutcomes of the changes. The coverage starts with ports, continues with rail and ends with roads.
The last section discusses some of the more complex cross-sectoral issues, including the difficulty
Argentina is facing in taking on its new role as a regulator.
2. PORTS AND WATERWAYS
2.1. Before privatization and deregulation
Before its deregulation and privatization program, Argentina's  port traffic was declining steadily.
This decline was explained by a mix of factors:
(i)  Strong modal shift towards road transport. The total loss of traffic between 1970 and  1989
was  10  percent,  but  cabotage  experienced  a  loss  of  30  per  cent  due  to  intermodal
competition (trucks and pipelines). The port of Buenos Aires alone experienced a 52 percent
reduction in  the volume of cargo movement. Years of recession and the growth  in road
transport, particularly to Brazil, Chile (stimulated by a wide trucking deregulation in these
two countries) and Patagonia (in the South of Argentina) were among the main contributing
factors.
(ii)  Economic  inefficiency of the Argentinean ports.  Argentina's  port tariffs and  charges had
increased steadily during the 1980s, so that right before the reforms,  Argentina reportedly
had among the highest port charges in the world. Between 1980 and 1991 stevedoring fees
had increased in real terms by 250 percent. A combination of restrictions, working practices,
high wages, outdated equipment and overly centralized administration was the key reason.
(iii)  Competition exercised by the ports of Chile. Part of the hinterland of the ports of Argentina
and the ports of Chile is common. Inefficiency in the operation of  Argentina's ports and the
reform experienced in Chile, explained much of the decline in traffic.
(iv)  High tariffs and cross subsidization. Tariffs and practices at the port of Buenos Aires were
used as norm for the rest of public ports. Rent equipment charges or stevedores salaries, for
example, would be agreed upon for the port of Buenos Aires and then adopted by the other
national  ports.  This  caused a  higher  level  of  usage  costs  across  the  port  system  than
suggested by real local'costs since the costs in Buenos Aires were high due to factors such as
routine dredging, pilotage and towage services, which represented over 65 percent  of the
total cost faced by a ship. Without the potential gains from a more competitive environment,
2there was no complain since despite its high operating costs, the revenues from the port of
Buenos Aires helped to cross-subsidize most of remaining public ports. Between 1988 and
1990, for example, the  ports of  Buenos Aires  enjoyed an  average  operating  surplus of
US$26.7 million per  year, while the rest  of the port system  as a whole  had  an average
operating deficit of US$19 million.
(v)  Inefficient  and  inappropriate investment. In  addition, the lack  of adequate infrastructure
investments which made the port  of Buenos Aires facilities obsolete, as well as its "open
port"  characteristic,  in contrast with a  terminal-based port,  induced  inefficient  operating
practices and unnecessary costs associated with cargo handling and storage.
Most of these factor should sound familiar to port administrators in most developing countries and
in some developed countries. The main difference maybe is that at the time few policymakers had
been as daring and committed as Argentina's government in taking on the challenge of transforming
the sector.
2.2. The new policy
The new policy was put  in place in  1992-93. Deregulation of traditionally highly regulated port
services was introduced formally by decrees limiting regulation to safety, environmental protection
and user protection from violations of competition. Liberalization of key port  activities occurred
through contractual arrangements with stevedoring companies, deregulation of pilotage and towage
services, freedom to establish tariffs, allowing foreign ships to practice cabotage, and abolishing
previous labor agreements and norms that were hampering productivity in port operations. The key
change however was the decision to privatize ports that could attract private operators. 3
The restructuring process.  The private  sector was  given the  authorization  to  build  and
operate ports of public use. This allowed competition to unfold as it made credible the potential
threat to their monopoly power for the existing ports on the extensive area along the Rio de la Plata
where  port  operations  are  feasible.  The smallest  ports  with  doubtful  interest  for  large  private
operators were  decentralized and it was left to the provincial governments to  decide whether to
3Port  privatization means two things in Argentina:  a port can be private strictu sensu and the land is privately owned (Dock Sur is
an example). By contrast, terminals (as in the port of Buenos Aires) can be  state-owned, and be concessioned for periods ranging
between 18 and 25 years. The concessionaries have to invest and maintain the infrastructure as specified in the terms of the
concession.
3continue their operation. The largest port, Buenos Aires, was divided into three areas with different
functions and administrations. The area called Dock Sud was transferred to the province of BAs as a
port specialized in liquid bulks, especially petrochemical products. The area called Puerto Nuevo
remained under national jurisdiction and was split into six terminals which would compete among
each other and would be concessioned for operations to the private sector. The area called Puerto
Sur, still to  be developed, would be concessioned to the private sector for new construction and
development.
Overall, the new structure was intended to improve port operations by fostering competition
both between ports and within ports, as in the port of Buenos Aires, where 6 terminals now compete
for cargo movement and handling. By 1998 there were three main terminals competing in container
traffic.  The distribution  of market  shares was the  following: terminal  1 and 2  (P&O and  local
partners)  (35%),  terminal  5  (25%)  and  Exolgan (Dock  Sud) (30%).  Terminal  4  is  small  and
dedicated to general cargo. Terminal 3 is multipurpose: general, cars and passengers, and has lost
traffic in favour  of a new private port of public use (Zarate) open  in  1996. This private port  is
located 75 kilometers upstream in Rio de  la Plata and  is gaining market share  in cars.  Finally,
terminal  6  has  gone  bankrupt.  Therefore in  conteinerized cargo  only  three  operators  currently
compite in the market after the deregulation process.
Inter-port  competition  is  one  of  the  expected  outcomes  of  the  privatization  and
decentralization  policy.  Dock  Sud belongs to  the Province of  Buenos  Aires  but  it  is  close  to
terminals I&2 and terminal 5. It is in fact part of the port of Buenos Aires, competing in the same
hinterland. Dock Sud is a private port  initially specialized in  liquid bulks but restructured  after
deregulation in  order to  compete in the container business. There  is some concern about unfair
competition between Dock Sud and the other private terminals in terms of the different amount of
taxes paid to the State and the Province. Dock Sud bears a lower financial burden because there is
not a equivalent cannon to be paid to the Province.
The concessions. In  1995, the New Port Authority awarded the 6 terminals to the highest
bidders, that is the bidder offering the highest annual payment to the government. Although bidders
were allowed to bid formore than one terminal, they could only be awarded one. The concession
terms ranged from  18 to  25 years.  During the term, the concessionaire has exclusivity over  all
loading and unloading services at the terminal but must guarantee service to anyone demanding it.
The government set maximum cargo charges in the bidding documents and concessionaires had to
specific their tariffs in the contract subject to this cap.
4The government  also privatized waterway dredging through a 10 year concession to dredge
and maintain the waterway connecting Santa Fe and the Atlantic Ocean. This involves deepening to
32 feet a waterway with a length of 465 miles. The concessionaire charges a toll for the use of the
waterway. The price structure consists of two components: signaling (buoys) and drawing, in order
to  reflect width  and depth, the two key determinants of costs. The signaling costs are allocated
according to ship size, and the tariff is related to the net registered tons of the ship. Dredging costs
are allocated according to the depth required by the ship (therefore they are drawing-related), and
tolls increase with distance and do not cover total costs as the government subsidizes the project.
The strategy is to reduce public support in the long term.
2.3. The results
The winning  bidders offered annual payments of US$32.5 million, considered to be a significant
step towards the fiscal objectives of the reform. The performance of Argentinean ports has also
changed dramatically since deregulation. Table 1 summarizes the structural transformation of port
infrastructure and  services once privatization combined with  liberalization were  introduced in  a
heavily protected and inefficient environment.
Table 1: Selected performance indicators for the port of Buenos Aires
Indicator  1991  1995  11996  197
Cargo (thousands of tons)  4,000  6,000  7,500  8,500
Containers (thousands of teu's)  300  540  752  1,023
Capacity (thousands of containers per year)  400  1,000  1,300  1,300
Cranes  3  13  13  13
Operational area (hectares)  65  95  132  132
Productivity (tons per worker per year)  800  3,000  3,050  3,100
Average stay for full containers (days)  2.5  1.5  1.5  1.3
Cost for container imports (US$ per ton)  450  120  120  120
Note: public operation  in italics
Source: Ministerlo de Economia
Annual container traffic jumped from 300 thousand to one million. Although this growth is partly
explained by the recovery of the national economy, the increase in capacity, productivity per worker
and  the  reduction  in  costs  and  average  stay  of  a  ship  clearly  show  that  efficiency  and
competitiveness are two main characteristics of Argentinean ports after port privatisation.
Decentralization has led to the closure of the small, unprofitable ports  transferred to the
provinces,  with  large  net  savings.  Most  of  the  savings  have  come  from  improved  labour
5productivity, however. At the port  of Buenos Aires, total employment fell from about 8,000 just
before the  reforms  to  2,500 in  1994 and  has remained around  that level.  The liberalization  of
operating  rules drastically reduced the requirements for stevedores in  the port  of Buenos Aires.
This, jointly  with  the introduction of modem systems of port  management, has  increased labor
productivity four-fold. The port is now open 24 hours a day during all the year (December 24* and
January I't excepted). Tariffs for port services have also declined by varying amounts depending on
the port, ship size, and type of service.
Summing  up. Overall, the deregulation and  privatization of port  and  maritime  transport,
combined with other major economic reforms, have had a considerably positive impact on external
trade, maybe the ultimate  indicator of success for this  sector. The decline in  Argentinean ports'
market  share was  quickly halted.  Maritime transport regained  its historical  share  in  Argentine
external trade, accounting for more than 90 percent of exports by volume and about 75 percent of
imports.
3. FREIGHT AND PASSENGER RAILWAYS
3.1. Before deregulation and privatization
The integrated national public enterprise responsible for railways services, Ferrocarriles Argentinos
(FA), had been losing traffic and market shares over the years. Between  1965 and  1990, intercity
passengers declined by 26 percent and metropolitan passenger by 35 percent. Freight services were
more adversely affected, with a drop of 50 percent in traffic during the same period. Between 1970
and 1989, the railway share in both freight and intercity passenger markets fell to about 8 percent
from levels of 14 and 1  I percent, respectively.
Financial performance continued to deteriorate in the years before 1989. For more than 15
years prior to privatization, FA's wage bill alone exceeded its total revenue. During the period 1980-
88, the  estimated  gap between FA's  operating revenues  and operating  and  capital  expenditures
amounted to an average of US$1,652 million per year (1992 US dollars).
As  in the case of ports, the factors that explain  the decline of Argentina's  railways  are
similar to many other large national railway companies:
(i) Lack of commercial orientation. Many of the  problems experienced by FA were typical of large
national railway companies. FA did not have a clear commercial policy. Managers were concerned
6more with production targets than with satisfying user needs. They were also heavily influenced by
the interests of labor unions and equipment suppliers. FA had too many employees for the amount
of  traffic  carried;  operating  practices  were  outdated,  and  railway  track  and  rolling  stock
maintenance was deficient.
(ii) Pricing policy.  The lack of commercially-oriented pricing and investment policies  explained
many of the difficulties faced by the Argentinean railways. FA did not have an explicit rates policy,
but freight rates were set at about 70 percent of the level offered by truckers. This policy satisfied a
demand for low-quality services, which was highly costly and conducive to loss-making behavior.
Likewise, FA's investment policy had no commercial rationale. Uneconomic lines were maintained
to  accommodate  labor  union's  requests  and  provincial  political  interests.  Locomotives  were
allocated to  uneconomic services which  did  not generate  sufficient funds  for maintenance  and
investments.
(iii) Poor investment. FA operated a national network of 35,000 kilometers and employed 92,000
people. As a result of the lack of commercially-oriented policies, FA could not generate sufficient
internal  funds  to  maintain  and  improve  the  network  adequately,  further  contributing  to  the
deterioration of track and equipment. By 1990, for example, 54 percent of the total network had its
track either in bad or fair condition, and only 49 percent of a total fleet of 992 locomotives were
available for service.
3.2. The new policy
The main objectives of the reforms were to reduce the railway's deficit and to stop the deterioration
of the service and once more competition for concessions were going to be the main implementation
instrument. A series of policy decisions adopted between 1989 and 1992 ultimately gave shape to a
railway  reform  strategy  that  was  based  on  horizontal  unbundling  and  privatization  through
concessions.  The fully integrated and centralized network  was divided  into separate businesses:
metropolitan commuter rail,  freight services and intercity passengers.
The Restructuring. The metropolitan suburban rail services and Metro (SUBTE) of Buenos
Aires followed a model of unbundling and concessions similar to that of the freight concessions.
Seven suburban railway services were identified according to the different rail networks that existed
in the  1940s before the creation of FA: Mitre, Sarmiento,  Urquiza, Roca, san Martin,  Belgrano
Norte and Belgrano Sur (see table 2). The urban rail service provided by the metro company was
7placed in a bidding package with the Urquiza line, whose end of line station is physically integrated
with the terminal station of the B line of  the underground. These services were then concessioned
to the private sector.
Freight services were partitioned into sub-networks, mainly, but not exclusively, according
to geographical (old private railways) and track (gauge width) criteria. More specifically, the freight
network was partitioned into 6 sub-networks with a total track of 27,000 kms. Each sub-network
was then concessioned to private consortia. Freight concessions remained vertically integrated: each
concessionaire  had  to  undertake  all  of the  activities  involved in  railroad  operations,  from  the
improvement and maintenance of fixed facilities such as stations and rail track, to the dispatching
and movement of trains as well as marketing and financial control. Concessionaires were given the
freedom to  introduce  new working  rules  and practices. Most intercity  passenger  services were
transferred to the provinces because they were not commercially attractive. Provincial authorities
were given the choice between running the passenger service and phasing it down.
Both  in  passenger  and freight  services, the  State has  remained the  owner  of  the fixed
facilities, including track, stations and the rolling stock. The concessionaires has to pay a fee for the
use of the infrastructure, and undertake project-specific annual investment as specified  in the terms
of the concessions. The length of the concessions were 10 years for metropolitan railways, 20 years
for the metro and 30 years for freight railways.
The concessioning process.  Metropolitan railway concessions were awarded on the basis of
a  single parameter:  the lowest  subsidy requested by the  concessionaire to  operate  the line  and
undertake the specified investment and rehabilitation program. The lowest subsidy is measured as
the first ten-year present value of the annual subsidy flow required to operate the line and undertake
the investment plans, net of the annual flow of the fee (or "canon") offered to be paid for the use of
fixed  assets  such  as  track  and  stations. This  method  of  awarding the  concessions  was  more
transparent, and probably induced a more rational behavior from potential concessionaires, than the
method used for the railway freight concessions.
Freight concessions followed the single operator model  and granted the concessionaire a
monopoly to run the services during the life of the concession. FA would not be allowed to compete
with the concessionaire, while concessionaires were not required to run passenger services. This
single operator strategy meant that competition would not arise from  several operators using the
same track, but  from  several potential operators bidding for the right to  provide the  service in
isolation during the life of the concession. This unbundling strategy was chosen because  of the
8complexity found in establishing the operation rules in the previous attempt to unbundle railways
along horizontal lines. It was not the recommendation of any elaborate and comprehensive study of
options, but the result of historic inertia and political consensus. The political expediency required
to carry out the reform was another factor that favored the choice of the vertically integrated option.
Operators have the option to run intercity passenger, but must allow access to the track to other
passenger operators in exchange for a toll. This separation between freight and passenger services
was decided because the freight business was not profitable enough to  continue cross-subsidizing
passenger operations.
Metropolitan railway concessions differ from freight concessions in two aspects. First, while
freight concessionaires were expected to be profitable and pay their fees and rents to the State, it
was accepted from the start that suburban rail operations might need fiscal support to operate the
services, but most importantly, to undertake the much needed rehabilitation and investments in track
and rolling  stock.  The Government identified for each  line the  amount and type  of investment
needed and private operator was expected to undertake such program.
Viability studies of the intercity passenger services concluded that only one corridor, Buenos
Aires-Mar del Plata, was commercially profitable. Low traffic levels prompted the government to
decide not to subsidize any of them. Instead, the government offered the provinces the option to
continue  providing the services at their own expense. Most provinces rejected this offer,  so the
routes were closed. Provinces that accepted the offer entered into concession agreements with the
state, which transferred to them the rolling stock and other equipment necessary to run the services.
The provinces agreed to subsidize the services and run them over the network concessioned to the
freight and computer rail operators, paying a fee to these operators for access to and use of the
track.
3.3. The results
The results are not that clear cut for the subsector as whole. As discussed in the later , the
mixed reviews have ended up in a 1998-99 renegotiation of most contracts. This stems from the fact
that  the extremely  high  expectations promoted at the time  of privatization have not  been  met.
Compared to  the  situation  prior  to  privatization however,  the  following discussion  shows  that
overall, the improvements in service quality have been quite significant. The most immediate and
painful change for the system as a whole was the reduction in employment from 92,000 workers to
9about 17,000 in  1998. Politically, this is still proving to be a tough sell mainly because the fiscal
goals have not really been achieved as expected. In spite of the privatization and the reduction of
the required public expenditures in the sector, the government is still spending US$400 million/year
in subsidies, in addition to a commitment to pay for US$6 billion in investment over the next 20
years. 4 But the specifics vary tremendously across concessions.
Metropolitan.  Tables 2  reflects the evolution of the metropolitan railways concessions and the
underground of Buenos Aires. These indicators show significant improvements in the service level
and a positive demand response to better service in all lines.
Table 2:Performance of Metropolitan Railway Concessions
(all units  in millions)  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997
Mi}R1"S''tre  1  '  Revenue  passengers  (s)  34.41  3829  53.48'"  69.81  80.58
Car-kms  16.28  16.92  14.47k  21.70  24.16
Revenue  passengers  (S)  60.47  61.27  81.8K  '  99.37  111.51
N,  Car-kms  20.28  20.68  17.924  23.74  29.07
Urqtsiza  Revenue  passengers  ($)  16.79  22.46  23.15  24.72  24.95
Car-kms  8.53  9.24  9.68  9.78  10.26
Revenue  passengers  ($)  64.91  75.77  116.46  136.02  147.03
Car-kms  25.97  33.80  38.90  43.08  48.10
San  .Martit0  Revenue  passengers  ($)  21.68  29.33  38.03  43.51  46.63
Car-kms  13.47  13.02  14.96  15.62  16.78
Revenue  passengers  ($)  11,81  14.78  25.37  28.79  32.28
Car-kms  8.52  8.33  9.87  10.53  12.96
Revenue  passengers($)  2.02  4.Ior  8.32  11.35  13.11
Car-kms  2.08  2.51t  4.64  6.35  6.88
Stzbte  Revenue  passengers  ($)  145.32  171.15  187.22  198.88  221.86
Car-kms  20.08  22.66  25.65  26.76  30.02
Note. public operation  i  italics.; § Public operation until May 1995.* Public operation until March 1994.t Public operation until April 1994.
Source: Ministerio de Economfa
These positive indicators are confirmed by surveys conducted by SOFRES-IBOPE in April
1998 and reported  in the press. 5 Over 85% of  the users of the urban trains  and of the subway
consider that the service offered has improved since privatization, while 10% think it is similar and
less than 5% think it got worse. Most service quality indicators have improved as demanded by the
contracts. The main outstanding issue is that many users are still unhappy with the stations... but
4 Although this compares favourably to a total subsidy of around $1 billion/year before the reforms, the recent debate
surrounding the renegotiation made it clear that the resentment over the reduction in the coverage of the network has
been leading some politicians to equate the loss of service to the cut in subsidy.
El Cronista: " Trenes: Aval de usuarios a operadores", April 15, 1998
10their improvement was not addressed that specifically by the contracts. The operators are however
likely to be responsive to these concerns because of a tough competition with buses.
So far, the improvements in commuter trains have increased the market share of the railways
in the mobility of the metropolitan area of BA's.  The global significance of these figures can be
seen in  Table 3. Although the total number of trips is practically stable in the metropolitan area,
since 1991, the structure has changed substantially. Car ownership has experienced a rapid growth
with its market  share in the 20 million daily trips in Buenos Aires increasing from 22 percent in
1991 to 33 percent in 1997.
Besides  the  quality  improvement  of  suburban  railways  and  the  underground,  traffic
congestion has  substantially reduced the  commercial  speed of  buses  which,  operating  without
subsidy, have lost market  share dramatically, making the underground  and change in the modal
split, but it is still the predominant mode of transport with 42 percent of total traffic.
Table 3: Mobility in the metropolitan area of Buenos Aires (Thousand of daily trips)
MODE  1970  %  1991  %  1994  %  1997  %
Railways  1588  7,05  1162  5,76  1219  6,30  1755  9,06
Underground  1315  5,84  554  2,75  877  4,53  1067  5,51
Buses  12858  57,10  11765  58,37  9588  49,51  8138  42,02
Car  2700  11,99  4500  22,32  5700  29,43  6425  33,17
Th  1656  7,35  660  3,27  777  4,01  777  4,01
Others  2399  10,65  1517  7,52  1207  6,23  1207  6,23
TOTAL  22516  100,00  20157  100,00  19368  100,00  19369  100,00
Source: operators' annual reports and Comisi6n Nacional de Regulaci6n de transporte. Ministerio de Economia
From a financial point of  view, private passenger services operations are having a  clear
impact. The burden of the costs is shifting from the government to the passengers. Private operators
are asking for an increase in the current subsidy levels for the subway to cover operating expenses
and some investment. For the passenger system as a whole however, subsidies are now shrinking
for the other passenger  concessions dropping from US$.30  in  1995 to US$.11  in  1998 with  an
increase in the number of travelers from 163 million to 217 over the same period. This increase in
demand  is requiring  additional  investment in  spite of the  early  fulfillment  of  the  investment
obligations  by the concession with  the fastest growing traffic  levels. In  exchange  for this  new
investment, the private operators of these passengers trains have asked (and obtained) higher tariffs
and longer concessions.  Most operators will  get a  17 to  30 years  extension (till  2017  to  2035
11depending on the concession) and an average tariff increase of 80% (spread over 4 years) over a
US$.60  average tariff to pay  for additional investments of about US$  5 billion  (most including
service quality improvements such as the requirement to have more air conditioned wagons with
more seats). 6 In loss making railways like Belgrano Norte and Belgrano Sur, the price increase is
basically  designed  to  keep  the  agreed  investment  plan  alive  and  to  progressively  reduce  the
operating subsidy. The process is hotly debated in Argentina and for the users exposed to the higher
initial tariffs, the  increase  is likely  to  represent an increase  in  monthly  travel  costs  significant
enough to raise some concern.
Intercity. There is little available information on the intercity passenger services run by the
Provinces to  a large extent as a result of the decentralization strategy adopted at the time  of the
reform which covered not only the responsibility for the service but also its monitoring . The most
important  issues raised stem from two main sources. The first is the concern  with the  level of
subsidies these services receiving are demanding from financially constrained Provinces. While the
political value of maintaining their operation are easy to understand, many observers have been
questioning whether they represent value for money or urged to consider fairly the alternatives. This
debate has however not yet taken place formally and remain a marginal source of concern locally.
The second issue has a more pressing dimension. There are interactions between these services and
the  freight  concessions  who  control  and  maintain  the  track,  Passenger  services  need  more
maintenance than freight trains and  freight concessionaires are reportedly  not doing  a particular
good job  of maintaining the track at stipulated standards. In addition, the access fee that freight
concessionaires charge the passenger trains may be too high as compared to international standards
(up to  1O  times in some cases) and could be an issue the regulatory agency will soon have to deal
with.
Freight. The level of tonnage carried by the new concessionaires has increased significantly,
from 7.4 millions tons the last year of public operation to over  17 million in  1997. Despite this
recovery the level of traffic realized is considerably below that projected with the only exception of
Ferrocarril  Mesopotcimico. In addition, the oldest concession, Ferroexpreso  Pampeano,  has not
been able to improve much and has been finding difficulties associated with floodings and adverse
markets  conditions.  As  a  whole,  private  operators are reaching  an  average  70  percent  of the
6 The average initial tariffs varied from US$.34 at the beginning of the concessions and are now US$.54 and US$.68 for
increase of 40% to 60% depending on the concession. The additional increases would vary from 50 to 100% over the
next 4 years.
12projected traffic  and,  according to  some estimates, actual revenues may be  between  50 and 60
percent of expected levels.
The under-performance of freight operators is partly due to the strong competition  from
trucks. FA followed the practice of setting the rates at 70 percent of the trucking rates. Private
freight rail operators assumed that their improved service would allow higher rates without fully
anticipating  the  likely  response  from  truckers  and  the  possibility  that  the  demand would  not
materialize as expected. Ferroexpreso Pampeano (Rosario-Bahia Blanca concession), for example,
has  had  losses during  its  first three  years of  operation due,  among other reasons, to  increased
competition from trucks, delays in the privatization of the port of Bahia Blanca, and a drop in the
international price of grains. Even though the resurgence of the Argentinean economy is said to be
changing  substantially the  pattern  of  production, the  type  of  products  carried  by  private  rail
operators does not seem to differ substantially from that carried before privatization.
The optimism in projecting demands levels, possibly induced by the bidding criteria used to
award the concessions, may bear some responsibility for the gap between realized and  expected
traffic levels. For the freight concessions, the private consortia did not have to accept a pre-specified
program of investments, unlike the bid for the metropolitan railways. Instead, they had to identify
investment  needs  and  propose  an  investment  program  for  the  first  5  years.  This  would  be
compulsory to fulfill, but could be modified from the sixth year of operations if demand conditions
warranted it. Nevertheless, the size of the present value of the investment flow during the first 15
years of the concession had a strong weight in the bid evaluation criteria. This criterion of selection
undoubtedly  may have  induced the concessionaires to  make demand projections  and  associated
investment promises that were unrealistic but helped them obtain the concession.
The Government is reviewing the initial contracts, to concentrate investment efforts in the
main  corridors,  to  close  the  rest  of  the corridors  and  to  allocate  a  fixed  share  of  revenue  to
investment. Investment commitments made by the concessionaires are reduced and arrears in canon
payments  are being converted  into new investment obligations.  In total,  this  means  an  overall
investment obligations  of  US$30-35 million/year to  operate a  network  of about 22,000  km.  In
exchange, the concessionaires are giving up on their exclusivity rights. In general, this is not sitting
well in the current presidential election environment where the fact that expectations from freight
concessions have not been met, combined with the fact that the concessionaire have arrears in canon
payments of  close to  $15 million  is proving to  be  a challenging political  item for  the  current
administration.
13Summing up. Overall, and in spite of the tough debates taking place in this election year, the
outcomes are perceived as improvements since privatization. Nevertheless, there is some concern
on the distribution of benefits between government, producers and consumers as illustrated by the
recent debate surrounding the renegotiation of the contracts and the resulting tariff increased for
passengers and reduced canon for freight concessionaires. The vertical integration of some railway
operators  with  railway  construction  and  equipment suppliers  may make  it  profitable  to  renew
equipment or to invest at a higher than reasonable rate in some segments of the network. However,
there is no strong evidence that this is happening even if  the incentive to do so appears to be high
and basing  re-negotiations  on price increases and  quality improvement plus  longer concessions
would be a natural consequence of this incentive.
4. ROADS
4.1. Before deregulation and privatization
Argentina has a mature and well-connected network of 500,000km. The national network (75% of
traffic) covers about 38,000 km (75% paved), the provincial network  181,000km (18% paved) and
the rest is municipal (29% paved). Its main problem at the time the reforms were being conceived
was poor quality die to a lack of maintenance. At the national level, maintenance expenditures had
been squeezed by the shortage of governrment  funding due to a strong decline in own sources of
funding and in particular the end in 1991 of earmarking of taxes (fuel taxes mostly) to the financing
of roads.  In  fact while  during much of the  1980s about 90%  of the resources  available to  the
National  Road  Agency were  from earmarked taxes, by  1992, 100% of  its resources  were  from
general revenue sources allocated through the standard budgetary process.
The financing problem was compounded by the high cost of public sector construction and
maintenance. Construction costs averaged about twice what might be considered best practice (up to
5 times in some provinces as a result of dubious public works procurement practices).
4.2. The new policy
The reform of the roads sector started in  1990. To address the major costs and financing
problems of the sector, its primary objectives were the reconstruction and maintenance of existing
14roads and the reduction of the public finance required by the sector. Involving the private sector in
exchange for the right to charge users tolls was seen as a way to both shifting the financial burden to
users and maintaining roads more efficiently.
Restructuring. The general privatization strategy was to unbundle financially viable roads
into build-operate-transfer (BOT) concessions awarded through competitive bidding. Most of the
traffic is concentrated near major city nodes, such as Buenos Aires and to a lesser extent Rosario
and C6rdoba. Thus, the national concession program has so far focused on the multilane roads and
freeways serving these cities, along with other intercity and major city access roads. It applies now
to  almost  9500km  of  roads.  The  concession  program  was  complemented  by  an  auction  of
management  contracts  (generally for  5 years)  for rehabilitation  and  maintenance covering now
about  12,000km of national roads divided into 400 sections and auctioned out into 61 contracts.
Also, non-toll concession contracts cover about 1900km of national roads (6 corridors) and allow
the  government  to  rely  on  a  private  financing  of  the  initial  rehabilitation  in  exchange  for  a
commitment  to  future  disbursements  of  monthly  subsidies  during  the  10  years  term  of  the
concessions.  A more recent  program called "km/month"  covers  basic maintenance  and  service
contracts for 4100km of less travelled roads. Overall, about 70% of the national road network is de
facto under private  operation. The discussion below focuses on the evolution  of the  concession
strategy of the national government.
The concessioning process: part 1- The Intercity Highways In the first wave of privatization,
the government  concessioned  about a third (3000km) of the intercity  highway  system, offering
twelve  12-year concessions in  1989 and awarding them in early  1990. The segments had traffic
averaging at least 2,000 to 2,500 vehicles a day, a level considered viable for private concessions
that focused on road maintenance as opposed to new construction. In return for the right to collect
tolls, the concessionaires were required to undertake a program of maintenance, rehabilitation, and
capacity  improvements.  Built  into  the  concessions  was  a  toll  structure  subject  to  price  cap
regulation. It set a uniform value per kilometer for each class of vehicle and was consistent across
all concessions. The maximum toll  was five times the basic toll (US1.5/lOOkm) and was to  be
determined by vehicle size, number of axles and distance traveled between toll booths. To protect
concessionaire revenues against inflation, tolls were to be updated using a formula giving roughly
equal weight to the cost of living index, the wholesale price index, and the value of the U.S. dollar.
But the government provided no revenue guarantees to the concessionaires.
15The service levels, defined to reach past service levels, were measured by an index of road
serviceability (the state of the pavement) ranging from 1 to  10. Targets were set for three periods:
during the first three years, the objective was to reach an index of about 6.4; in the following seven-
year period, the index was to improve to 8; and during the last two years of the concession, it could
not fall below 7.5. The concessionaires obligations included undertaking certain investments before
starting to collect tolls, such as correcting the most serious deficiencies in the pavement and in
vertical signaling, and undertaking other investments during the term of the concession to achieve
the  serviceability  targets.  Although  the  bidding  documents  did  not  specify  the  size  of  the
investments required to reach the serviceability targets, it was estimated that at least 50 percent of
the network would have +o  be re-paved during the first three years, with another full re-pavement
durin-  the remaining nine years of the concession. The concessionaires were also initially obligated
to  pay  a  fee  (canon)  to  the  state for the  use  of the  road  infrastructure during  the  life  of  the
concession and to take legal responsibility for any accidents resulting from poor road conditions.
The concessions were awarded in twelve simultaneous bidding contests. The bidding was
competitive, with 147 bids submitted. The concessions were awarded to thirteen consortia formed
by forty-six private companies. These thirteen consortia were to pay canon totaling US$890 million
(1990 dollars). While the canon was the key criterion in the bid selection, there were many other
criteria, including technical qualifications and timing of investment.
These intercity road concessions had been in operation for only  five months  in February
1991  when  the  government  decided  to  suspend  the  contracts  and  renegotiate  them.  Several
developments led to that decision. First, the prohibition of indexation introduced as part of a major
macroeconomic adjustment plan was going to  have a direct  impact on the tolls. Second,  many
concessionaires  started  to  collect  tolls before undertaking  the required  investments.  Third, toll
booths were located either at a relatively short distance from one another or near urban centers in
order  to  capture  suburban trips  lack of  access alternatives  created  captive traffic.  These three
developments prompted public protest and strong pressure to reduce  tolls.
The renegotiations resulted in a major overhaul in the design of the concessions. Tolls were
reduced by more than 50 percent. To compensate the concessionaires, the canon was eliminated,
and the government also granted concessionaires a total annual subsidy of US$57 million for the
rest  of the  concession, which was extended by one year. The subsidy, to  be distributed  among
concessionaires according to the size of their value added tax (VAT) contributions, amounts to a
shadow toll because VAT contributions are directly related to traffic levels. The location of toll
16booths and  the commitments and  schedules for road works  were  also renegotiated,  leaving the
concessionaires with  a  significant cuts in the value of the business they had  entered two  years
earlier. 7 In 1995, in view of the quick expansion of traffic, a second re-negotiation was initiated by
the government to include new investments in the concession areas. As  long as these would not
represent more than 20% of the net present value of the total investment obligations  (including
those covered by the initial contract), the incumbent would be eligible for a direct negotiation with
the government  with  a  view to  extent their concession term.  Otherwise,  the  contracts for  new
investment would have to be auctioned publicly. So far (early 99 or 4 years later!)only one such
renegotiation has succeeded (the concessionaire of corridor 18 got a 15 years extension in exchange
for a  commitment to US$53 million of additional investment and  for giving up on the subsidy
promised during the 1991 renegotiation). The other concessions are unlikely to get extensions of
more than 3 years and will in exchange make new investments of about $150 million and give up
the subsidy promises or at least a strong reduction in their levels before their end at the end of the
original tenure of the contract.
The  concessioning process: part  2  - The  Buenos  Aires  Access  Roads.  In  1992, the
government  initiated  a  second  wave  of  concessions  for  the  maintenance,  operation,  and
improvement of three strategic access highways radiating from Buenos Aires. A fourth concession
with no right to collect tolls was negotiated with a construction company that had been building a
road under a public contract for many years. They highways add up to roughly 200km.
The government,  benefiting from  its experience with the  intercity concessions,  designed
simple, straightforward concession terms and bidding criteria for the Buenos Aires  access roads.
Bidders  received  a  comprehensive  concession  contract  detailing  the  amount  and  schedule  of
required  investments, the required  service level,  and the risk-sharing  arrangements between the
government and the concessionaire. The contract allocated the bulk of the project risk to the private
concessionaire by precluding any revenue or traffic guarantees or any other guarantee of financial
support  from  the  government.  In  addition,  the  contract  assigned  to  the  concessionaire  the
responsibility  for  risks  associated  with  pending  land  expropriations.  And  it  required  the
concessionaire to build parallel untolled access roads, mainly collector streets. The bidding criteria
were reduced to one variable: the lowest toll offered.
7According  to an interview givenby Raul Costamagna, the Public Works Secretary who is responsible for the
monitoring of the concessions interviewed by one of the main Argentinean newspapers, El Cronista, in the December 13
1998, the companies are still having rates of return of 26% to 38% and the government considers that a reasonable reate
of retruns should be between 12 and 16%.
17The main features of the concessions for the Buenos Aires access roads are the following:
they  are  twenty-two  years  and  eight  months  long;  the  state  retains  ownership  of  the  road
infrastructure; all new  construction, rehabilitation, improvement, and maintenance operations are
performed by the concessionaire, which is legally responsible for any accident caused by poor road
conditions; the basic toll is the one bid by the concessionaire and is subject to some constraints: it
cannot by higher than a cap set by the government. This cap is calculated as the lower of the value
of the benefit (in terms of cost reductions) obtained by the road users and of the reasonable rate of
return allowable to a concessionaire  The concessionaire is obligated to carry out specific works
before starting to charge tolls and other works throughout the life of the concession and, at the end
of the concession, the concessionaire must transfer the roads in perfect maintenance condition. The
concessionaire derives revenues from tolls and from commercial exploitation of service areas as
authorized by the regulator, Organo de Control de Concesiones. The government does not guarantee
minimum traffic levels and provides no other guarantees.
While these concessions were more carefully prepared than the earlier ones, they have not
been problem free. First, there was not much competition among bidders. The numbers of bidders at
most  2  (in  two  of  the  cases).  The potential benefits  for the  users  had  been  estimated  by  the
government at levels varying from US$1.92  (the airport access)  to  US3.19 (West access). The
highest  bid  was $1 in  two  of the  cases and  $.56 for the airport access. Tolls have  since been
increased for all access roads by over 10%
4.3. The results
Overall, the results  of the concessions have been mixed so far with respect to the initial
objectives. In spite of significant improvement in quality and in traffic, the fiscal gains expected
were not as high as expected initially to a large extend as the impact of the 1995 world financial
crisis that influenced demand quite significantly in Latin America.  Since the  1998 crisis did not
help, a new round of renegotiation was needed in 1998 and recently concluded as discussed below.
For the intercity highway concessions, the  success in  terms of quality  of roads  is clear.
Maintenance of this intercity highway system, including the concessioned portions, has improved
significantly. The share of paved roads in bad conditions declined from about 30 percent in 1989 to
25 percent in 1993, and the regulator predicts that it will fell below 10 percent by 1999. The success
in terms of traffic increase is also hard to de:ny.  Road use has more than quadrupled between 1991
18and 1997, raising toll revenues from almost US$60 million in  1991 to almost US$300 million in
1998.. .but  this  still  required  an  accumulated (unpaid) subsidy  by the  government  of  US$120
million (according to the government) to US$200 million (according to the concessionaires). The
most disturbing fact, politically, is that this has happened in spite of a 50% increase of the average
toll (from USI.1 to about $1.6/lOOkm)  during between 1991 and 1998.
This is part of the reason why the results are viewed by some as mixed. While maintenance
of the concessioned network is no longer a major drain on government budgets, government annual
subsidies had increased from US$23 million in 1991 to more than US$65 million by 1996, in part
because of the  government's reluctance to  allow toll  increases. Since these  subsidies are much
higher than initially anticipated and since they remained unpaid, it created a tension between the
concessionaires and the government. In addition, investments werre behind schedule because the
first renegotiations reduced the concessionaires' potential returns. All this has resulted in a new re-
negotiation which ended in early  1999 with an extension of all contracts until year 2006 with no
increase in tariff for now and the cancellation of the government liability for subsidies in arrears.
Tariff will be adjsuted every time cost increases have reached more than 5%.
As for the concessions for urban access roads have, while they provided some badly needed
urban highway capacity that the government otherwise might not have built, expectations have not
yet been met either. Table 4 summarizes the evolution of traffic and tolls collected on these 4 access
roads.
Table 4: Evolution of Traffic and Revenue in Buenos Aires Access Toll Roads
La Plata- Buenos Aires  North  Riccieri  West  TOTAL
1995  Number  of verhicles in  8,747,744  8,747,744
traffic equivalent units)  (45,567)
(average daily traffic)  (  ,_)
Revenue in US$ million  13.7  13,7
1996  Number of verhicles  30,531,526  36,912,700  67,444,226
(78,113)  (218,451)
Revenue in US$  47.9  43.7  91,6
1997  Number of verhicles  35,758,100  101,423,750  32,806,568  23,916,121  193,904,539
(90,163)  (232,384)  (98,973)  (92,327)
Revenue in US$  56.1  120.2  16.8  11.9  204,9
1998  Number of verhicles  42,018,634  113,637,947  46,900,140  51,936,972  254,493,693
(104,339)  (257,132)  (110,355)  (115,214)
Revenue in US$  65.9  125.7  23.9  37.1  252,3
Total  Number of verhicles  117,056,004  251,974,397  79,706,708  75,853,093  524,590,202
Revenue in US$  183.7  289.2  40.7  48.9  545,8
19Traffic growth is good and so appears to be revenue. The disappointment stems from the fact
that achieving all the objectives is taking longer than expected. Construction for two of the four
access  concessions  has  been  delayed  by  legal  problems  resulting  from  much  harder  land
expropriation and household relocations than expected. Because of the delay, the concessionaires
have been  unable  to  start  collecting their  tolls  needed to  meet  commitments  made  under  the
financing plan. The other two concessionaires could initially collect only part of their tolls because
not  all their facilities  are in place as a result of technical delays. Moreover, in three of the four
concessions, required investments were delayed quite significantly while in the fourth, investment
was accelerated as demand was putting pressure on the concessionaire.
Overall, three main lessons can de drawn from the reforns  in the road sector. First,  it is
important to have simple and transparent criteria for the bidding. In the initial round for the intercity
concessions, the bidders had to satisfy a long list of technical and financial criteria, all with different
weightings.  By  contrast,  bidding for  the  Buenos  Aires  access road  concessions  used  a  single
criterion, and investment obligations were discussed with  potential investors  before the  bidding
documents were finalized. Using a single, unambiguous criterion not only provides transparency in
the  award process.  It  also  avoids unnecessary complications  resulting  from  trade-offs  between
offers on multiple criteria by competing bids.
Second, the rules for renegotiating contracts should be spelled out as early and as clearly as
possible. Adequate rules were not issued until 1995. These new rules specify the conditions under
which changes in some aspects of the contracts are allowable, and they recognize the importance to
the  concessionaire  of  ensuring  that  re-negotiation  does  not  alter  its  financial  return  when  the
problems that  led to the re-negotiation are beyond its control. There have been several cases  in
which  such problems  have forced  the  government to  renegotiate  the  contracts.  In  other case,
pegging the new peso to the dollar made the contracts' tariff escalation clauses ilLegal. Before the
new guidelines were adopted, the concessions were renegotiated bilaterally, with each party seeking
the best  deal it could get. Now,  all the allowed options and the terms of  eligibility are clearly
specified so that all concessionaires are playing by the same rules.
Third, institution building must be taken seriously. Before the concessioning, all the main
technical functions (planning, design, maintenance, construction) for the national highway network
were the exclusive responsibility of the Direccion Nacional de Vialidad (DNV). The same functions
were performed by similar agencies at the provincial level. Poor coordination among these agencies
led to poor planning and inefficient decisions. The reform transferred the management and control
20of roads to the provinces. The DNV was to become a national planning and coordinating agency
responsible for allocating resources and auditing their use for national highways while also acting as
a regulator  for these highways.  The DNV does  not yet fully perform either  function.  It is not
independent,  and  it  is  inadequately  organized  and  staffed  to  effectively  supervise  the
concessionaires.  Nor  does  it  require  meaningful  reporting  by  the  concessionaires.  Similar
institutional weaknesses occur in supervision of the access road. The responsible agency, located in
the Secretariat of Public Works, does not collect or publish information on a regular basis, and its
staff, though very committed, have been neither assigned clear goals nor provided with  sufficient
resources.
Summing up. Overall, , the outcomes are also perceived as improvements since privatization.
The main problem here has been in the interaction between the government and the concessionaires.
Subsidies levels ended up increasing beyond expectations and since the government accumulated
arrears in the payments of its subsidies, it increased the perception of a high residual role in the
financing of the private sector. While this has become an issue in an election year, it also eased the
justification  of an extension of the inter-city contract in exchange for a "no more toll increase"
position widely supported by users. A less plaisant outcome for the government was a debate as to
whether the contracts should be been auctioned again instead of renegotiations with the incumbents.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The experience of the Argentinean transport reform has showed that privatization and deregulation
provide efficiency gains that can be delivered to users while improving the fiscal situation.  So far,
and in spite of the unexpectedly high residual subsidy requirements of the sector, the fiscal cost is
indeed lower, services have improved and the new investment is taking place. This is the main
achievement of an economic transport policy based on a mix of competitionfor  the market, through
concessions, and competition in the market. Economic indicators clearly point out to increases in
capacity,  better  price-service  level  combinations  and  positive  demand  response.  This  may  be
viewed as a major deception for anyone who expected the end of the public sector in Transport. The
fact is this experience shows that it is hard to totally eliminate public financing in the sector, but it is
certainly possible to reduce it drastically. For railways, total subsidies/passengers  are now less than
a third of what they were under public operation (US$.76 per passenger in 1986 assessed in  1996
21US$). there are no subsidies left in ports and with the lastest round of negotiations, there should be
hardly any subsidy in intercity roads.
The need for better targeting of some of the subsidies towards the poor is an issue likely to
become important soon, as the last wave of contract extensions in rail and roads comes to an end.
But this is likely to be a natural outcome of the extensive formal and informal consultation process
that  has  surrounded  this  latest  round  of  contract  renegotiations.  Already  there  are  special
arrangements being negotiated in some neighborhood between users and concessionaires and the
government is looking into options for passenger trains. All this  is work in progress and still to
recent to be able to report any significant breakthrough.
Argentina's  decade  long  experience also  shows that  there is  a  learning by  doing  in  the
reform process. For inexperienced new regulators, new problems and challenges quickly develop in
the control of monopoly power and of the incentives for private investment in the long run. The
design of the reform process and the "government commitment" to minimize its role in the sector
and  to  respect its  original  promises to  users as much as  to concessionaires  are crucial for  the
sustainability of reforms.  Argentina's  experience shows that it is very important to build up the
regulatory  capacity  needed to  monitor the  contracts, in  particular when  initial uncertainty  with
respect to  demand and cost conditions is strong and renegotiation is a most likely outcome of a
daring reform. As always, its main challenge on monitoring contracts is to get enough information
to reach an adequate balance in its decisions on the distribution of efficiency gains between private
investors  and  consumers... and  this  is  the area  in  which  Argentina  may not  have  yet  met  the
challenge.
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